In 2016, Creed & Gowdy filed a notice of appeal on behalf of their client, Guillermo Tabraue, III, Esq., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Suyma Torres in the Third District Court of Appeal, after the trial court dismissed the Estate's complaint with prejudice. During the course of briefing, Bryan Gowdy argued that a hospital has a nondelegable, implied contractual duty to provide emergency care to a patient. In March, the Court issued it's opinion, affirming the trial court's ruling. Mr. Gowdy, along with the Estate's trial counsel, Jorge Silva, are now taking the case to the Florida Supreme Court, having filed a jurisdictional brief on May 17, arguing that the Third District certified a direct conflict between its decision below and three decisions of the Fourth District. See Art. V, §3(b)(4), Fla. Const; (certifying conflict with Newbold-Ferguson v. Amisub (N. Ridge Hosp.), Inc., 85 So. 3d 502 (Fla 4th DCA 2012); Wax v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); and Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)).
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In October 2018, in a 2-1 decision, of-counsel, Thomas Burns, convinced the Second District Court of Appeal to reinstate a medical malpractice claim in its entirety. In November 2018, the appellee moved for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. Mr. Burns, on behalf of the appellant, opposed. After five months, the Court issued its order denying rehearing.
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Click here to read the order.
Creed & Gowdy, P.A., represented the parents of a child injured in a carnival ride called the "Psycho Swing" in a certiorari proceeding challenging the parents' right to seek punitive damages for their daughter's injuries. Daniel Mahfood first implemented a plan to have the trial court remedy potential procedural defects in the order granting leave to seek punitive damages. Then, in the certiorari proceeding, Mr. Mahfood argued that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's remaining challenges and that the defendant's arguments were substantively meritless as well. The appellate court agreed and issued a sweeping denial. The appellate court held that the Defendant's arguments were jurisdictionally barred and that the parents had sufficiently alleged punitive conduct even as to a corporate entity, freeing the parents to pursue punitive damages against all of the defendants in the lawsuit.
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Center for Responsible Lending is a non-profit policy, advocacy, and research organization dedicated to exposing and eliminating abusive practices in the market for consumer financial services. Public Justice is a national public interest legal organization, specializing in precedent-setting, socially significant civil litigation, with a focus on fighting to preserve access to justice for victims of corporate and governmental misconduct.
In a recent case, Barbara Fawcett vs. Citizens bank, N.A., Fawcett is seeking a panel rehearing or en banc hearing in the First Circuit Court of Appeals. They argue the decision was a misapplication of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). This misapplication presents a question of exceptional importance concerning how and when federal courts should or must defer to administrative agency statements. Bryan Gowdy filed a brief of amici curiae in support of Fawcett's motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc arguing the court should immerse itself into the "regulatory text and history," to interpret the words in 12 U.S.C. § 85 and grant rehearing or rehearing en banc and vacate the panel's opinion.
Creed & Gowdy, P.A. represented the respondent in a 2nd DCA certiorari review of an order overruling objections to deposition questions and compelling additional depositions in an automobile negligence action. This case was concerned with the plain language of the "accident report privilege" set forth in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, and whether it shielded information from pretrial discovery. The petition was denied stating that the current version of section 316.066(4) did not create a true privilege precluding the disclosure of statements of individuals involved in an accident for the purpose of completing a crash report. Instead, it is a law of admissibility that precludes the use of these statements at trial.